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Abstract
In our world, an organization derives reputation from its past as if it were a natural
person, even though it technically possesses no xed characteristics (types). Moreover,
the reputation of an organization uctuates with its performance period by period, even
though di¤erent members are responsible in di¤erent periods. To understand the two
phenomena, the paper presents an OLG model where an organization is purely a name
shared consecutively by its members, each working for one period only, and its reputation
is driven by market competition. High quality producers outbid low quality ones for reputed
names only if a name has some specic value dynamics with its each period performance.
The dynamics in the second best is derived, which has four features: increasing after a
success; decreasing after a failure; destroyed totally by it if the value is already low enough;
immune to a failure for top names if they set honest prices that tell the quality of the
products.
Key words: Brand-names The Reputation of an Organizations Endogenized Value
Dynamics
JEL: D23, D82
1 Introduction
Against the wall of Student Service Centre of London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE) there are the pictures of thirteen Nobel Prize Laureates. Having them as students or
faculty members is indeed a glory of the school and it has good reason to display the glory. It
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of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, Essex, UK. Email: wangt@essex.ac.uk. I am indebted to John
Moore for his time, patience and advice. I also thank Timothy Besley, Leonardo Felli, Maitreesh Ghatak and
Michele Piccione for their helpful comments.
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is taken as an indication that LSE is excellent at present, in the same way as the past glories of
a natural person indicate his current quality. However there is a chasm between the reputation
of an organization and that of an individual. The reputation of an individual is anchored by his
type, namely the characteristics invariant over time. He derives reputation from his past since
it is useful to Bayesian updating the estimate of his type1. On contrary, the performance of an
organization is decided by the the aggregate quality of its members. The members come and
go from time to time and technically there is no guarantee that new members have the same
quality as the retired ones. Therefore, an organization technically has no xed characteristics,
namely type. Actually the glories displayed on the wall were often created by the members that
have nothing physically to do with the organizations now. For example, all the thirteen stars of
LSE has left it long ago. And that is a common knowledge. Then, the question is, given it has
no "type", why does an current organization still derive reputation from the past history, just
like a natural person who instead has the type?
Actually, we go further than believing in the meaning of history in the way of personifying
organizations. In addition, we make ethical judgements upon them, as if it were they that had
carried out the "wrong" or "right" deeds, rather than the persons in charge of them. If we
are persuaded by advertisements of General Motor to buy an expensive car but disappointedly
nd the car is not worth the price, we feel being cheated by the rm, rather than cheated by
its management that is actually on the responsibility. This "fair-trading" concern is always an
element of ethical evaluation upon rms. Now according to Financial Times, it is extended to
include "fuel-e¢ cient", "recycled", etc2. The point is that ethical evaluation, honestly pricing
particularly, is a part of an organizations reputation. What is its role in the reputation?
For the two questions, some could argue that the personalization of an organization is, at least
partly, supported by some invariant characteristics (type) of the organization that lie outside of
individual members. Generally, the magic type of an organization is called "culture". I do not
say culture does not exist or matter. However, in the paper I will cut o¤ "types" totally and
consider the two questions from the angle of economical e¢ ciency. Basically the argument is
that if we humans articially believe organizations derive reputation from the history that is not
substantially linked with them, the social economical e¢ ciency will be improved; if we moreover
articially impose ethical evaluation upon organizations, the e¢ ciency will be improved further.
And what we expect occurs in equilibrium. Overall, the message is that, no matter whether there
are other roots of personifying organizations in the two senses above, that is a clever creation of
1As a simple example, suppose the types are the probability of succeeding in doing something and the prior
distribution is uniform on the unit interval. Then reputation is the posterior estimate of the probability. If s
successes and f failures are observed for some person, then his reputation is s+1s+f+2 :
2"Ethical consumption makes mark on branding", Financial Times, 20/02/2007, pp24.
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our humans it increases social economical surplus!
Given that an organizations derives reputation from the history without backed by any type,
an related question is what is the dynamics of the reputation? For the reputation of an individual,
backed by his type, it is trivial to see that it increases with good performance and decreases
with the bad one3. Without anchored by type, what would the dynamics of an organizations
reputation look like? The reputation of a rm is generally represented by its brand value. Then
what will be the dynamics of the brand value? If taking the personalization further, we would
expect the dynamics to have the same features as that of an individualsreputation. But is that
true? And if true, for what economical reason?
To address these questions, the paper presents an overlapping generation (OLG) model that
has the following two features. For one, an organization are a collect of individuals in the
dimension of space and time. Here I abstract the space dimension4 and let an organization
consist of one member in each period. Moreover, I let each member work for just one period.
Then it is a common knowledge that the history of an organization is attributed to the past
members that have nothing to do with the organization of today, that is, type-like things are cut
o¤ totally. Thus in the paper an organization is nothing but a name shared consecutively by its
members of di¤erent periods. For the other feature, the reputation of an organization is driven
by market competition. In the paper, producer-sellers are of either high or low quality, which
is their private information (their type). High quality sellers succeed in producing valuable
goods with higher probability. In the economy, the history of past successes and/or failures
attribute some repuation to a name. In equilibrium, High quality producers outbid low quality
ones for reputed names, the names having histories of many successes but few or even none
failure, when names have some specic value dynamics with respect to their performance of
each period, which is inuenced by whether and which names are punished for "dishonestly
pricing". Actually, di¤erent value dynamics leads to di¤erent extent of reputed names signalling
and sorting out of high quality goods. The more separated are the two types, the higher social
surplus is created. The value dynamics leading to the second best is derived. It has the four
following features: (1) a names value increases after a success; (2) it decreases after a failure;
(3) it is destroyed totally if the value is already low enough; and (4) it is untouched to a failure
for the names that have the top value5 if they are found pricing honestly. Features (1) and (2)
are also found in the dynamics of the reputation of an individual, but (3) and (4) are specic to
3See also note 1 above. s+1s+f+2 is increasing with s and decreasing with f .
4That makes it di¤erent from the literature that focuses on the interaction of the members in a team, like
Tirole (1998) and Bar-Isaac (2004).
5It is proved that top value exists in any equilibrium.
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that of an organizations reputation6.
Spencer (1973) began the study of cost signalling game. In the literature of signalling games,
two innovations here are that the comparative advantage of good sellers in bidding signalling
instruments (good names here) is endogenously decided in equilibrium rather than exogenously
given, and that signalling does not waste social resource. Kreps (1990) invents the idea of
sustaining the reputation of organizations (names) through the resale market in the framework
of moral hazard. That paper cannot pin down the reputations value, which is done here in the
optimal equilibria, since it does not use competitive equilibrium framework. And the value does
not go up and down in that paper. On the contrary the value dynamics is an essential part of
the way for the reputation to work.
The closest work to the paper here is Tadelis (1999, 2002, 2003) (hereinafter Tadelis). They
have the merits, besides others, that good names (histories) are traded in all equilibrium and
the result robust to very short horizons. However all these merits are driven by the assumption
that ownership change of names is unobservable. With probability one half, for each name
the owner of yesterday is the owner of today, and thus the performance of yesterday is used
to Bayesian update the current owner. So something like types remains and organizations
reputation is partly anchored by it. Actually the merits he claims come from the fact that
history has substantial meaning due to this type-like thing. On the contrary, the paper here
goes back to Kreps (1990), cutting o¤ types totally7. Then as in Kreps (1990) the reputation
here is driven by specic equilibrium belief, which is regarded as a disadvantage by Tadelis.
However, many, if not most, great creations of our human society are driven by belief, such as
money, language8, laws and authority9, ethic, and probably, Gods. Thus the rst justication of
my approach is that our human beings do make great creations through nothing but spreading
and coordinating beliefs. Secondly, as pointed out by Hart (2001)10, in the real world while the
chef/owner change of a small restaurant may be unobservable, the owner/manager change of big
names is extensively reported and hardly unobservable, and only the big names have signicant
reputation capital. Thus organizationsreputation is hardly driven by the unobservability of the
owner-manager change and the approach with names having no substantial meaning is worth
6See also notes 1 and 3. s+1s+f+2 is increasing with s and decreasing with f , but is never to be 0 and never stop
decreasing with f .
7More generally, as pointed out in Tadelis (2003), any theory on the reputation of organizations (names) has
to fall in one of the two categories, either confering names with substantial meaning or driven only by belief.
8Bubble is always an equilibrium in any cheap talk game.
9Cf. Mailath, Morris and Postlewaite (2001).
10However the idea that a rms reputation matters only when (a signicant fraction of) consumers cannot
observe the change in ownership is not that plausible, in Hart (2001).
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an attempt. Moreover, the paper here derives the value dynamics of names in the second best,
which is empirically testable, whereas though Tadelis gets some dynamics he presents no reason
for that dynamics rather than many others to occur so that the dynamics is not ready to be
tested.
There is other research about the brand capital such as Klein and Le­ er (1981), Shapiro
(1983), Choi (1998), Andersson (2000) and Cabral (2000), which exploits the idea of brand names
signalling the quality of their products. However in those papers rms are not organizations
changing owner-managers from time to time, but real players enjoying the acquired prot. And
those papers do not derive value dynamics due to their partial equilibrium framework.
The research on collective reputation, such as Tirole (1996), Levin (2001) and Bar-Isaac
(2004), is also relevant since here the reputation is born by an organization rather than the people
running it. The di¤erence is that here organizations, which are the collect of the members in time
dimension, consist of only one member in each period, whereas in those papers organizations
consist of multiple members and the interaction among them is a key element of their models.
The model will consist of two parts, the basic part and its extension. In the basic part, the
only private information of sellers are their type, while in the extension they are assumed to have
another private information after the widgets are produced, for the purpose of engendering a
role to ethic and deriving a more realistic dynamics. Below section 2 is used to set up the model.
In section 3, as a benchmark I consider what happens if organizations do not derive reputation
from history. Then section 4 presents the second best in the basic model. The extension is
made in section 5. Section 6 discusses empirical relevance and concludes. Some proofs are put
in appendix.
2 The Basic Model
It is a standard Overlapping Generation (OLG) economy with the constant population. There
are innite periods, 1, 2,... And period t begins at date t and ends at date t + 1. The loan
market is complete and one period discount is r < 111. There are two goods, corn (endowment
good and numeraire) and widget (production good). The economy is populated with continuum
risk neutral sellers and even more buyers. Sellers live for two periods. When they are young,
each of them choose to produces one widget and then sells it for corn (or not); when they are
old, they consume the corn. Buyers live for one period, endowed with corn to buy widgets and
consuming both.
In each period, young sellers can choose to produce one widget at cost c. Each widget is
11The risk free interest is 1r   1:
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either useful and worth v for the buyer, or useless and worth v. Each young seller is of two types,
good and bad. Good sellers (G-sellers) produce a useful widget with probability q and the bad
sellers (B-sellers) with probability q < q: Without loss of generality I set v = 0 and v = v; q = 0
and q = q < 1: The share of G-sellers is :
Assumption 1: qv < c < qv:
qv is the expected value of the widgets if all B-sellers are engaged into production. Imag-
ine an equilibrium in which all sellers, bad and good, go to production. Then rational
buyers pay at most qv for an average widget, which nevertheless costs c. By the rst
inequality, average sellers will lose, which is impossible in any equilibrium. Therefore the
rst inequality asserts that in any equilibrium not all bad sellers enter production. Thus
bad sellers cannot get strictly positive return from production in any equilibrium. qv is the
expected value of the widgets produced by good sellers. The second inequality then says
that good sellers averagely generate positive social surplus. On the contrary, bad sellers
generate  c. Therefore it is socially e¢ cient to allow only good sellers to produce while to
exclude B-sellers out of production as possible as we can. The welfare analysis gives the
standard of equilibrium selection here, which is absent in Tadelis.
Denote  = qv   c, the social surplus generated by an average good seller. How to exclude
bad sellers is the core problem of the paper. The di¢ culty of excluding all sellers lies in the
information problem as follows.
Information Structure: In each period, at its start a young sellers privately knows his
type. When buyers are purchasing a widget, they do not observe its quality (being useful or
useless). However the quality information of each widget permeates through time so that at the
end of the period the quality of all widgets is public information to this and the next period
buyers and sellers. Nevertheless,
Assumption 2: This public information is not contractible when the widgets are traded.
The same assumption is made in Holmstrom (1999) career concern model where a manager
works for a specic rm in each period. At the end of the period, his performance is
perfectly observed by the labor market. However at the beginning of the period his wage
cannot be conditional on the performance. Surely the di¤erence is that in that paper the
manager never dies, which is why it is paper about individualsreputation, whereas in this
paper here each seller dies after one period and the reputation is borne by organization
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rather than by him personally. A similar assumption is made in Tadelis (1999, 2002, 2003),
who justies it in the way of incomplete contract (Hart & Moore (1990); Hart (1995)),
as it normally assumes that some ex post information is not contractible ex ante. And
more broadly it conforms with the spirit of Hayek (1945) that there is much information
unable to be used by social planners, mechanism designers or judges, but able to used
by decentralized markets12. In the paper here, the information is used through the name
market.
In each period, at the beginning an young seller decides rst whether to produce. If he decides
to produce, before production he gets a name for his rm, in two possible ways (for any period
but the rst one). Either he forms a new name costlessly. Or he buys an existing name from
an old seller in the name market13. After acquiring the name, he produces a widget and sells it
in the widget market. This process goes quickly so that the prot from it is not discounted. At
the end of the period before he retires, he goes to the name market again to sell the name to
some young seller of the next generation. Thus the resale value is discounted by r. After that,
he becomes old and consumes what he gets from selling the product and the name. Suppose the
price of a young sellers widget is w and he buys the name at price p014 while reselling it at p1.
Then his return is R =  p0 + w   c+ rp1:
A buyers utility is E(v)  w if she buys a widget at price w.
The reserve utility for the buyers not purchasing a widget and for the sellers not producing
is 0. And the only inter-generation link is transactions in the name markets.
A name could be used in several periods. The history of a name is dened as the quality
sequence of the widgets produced with the name. Even though the quality of each of these
widgets is attributed to a di¤erent seller, in the economy, as in our world, people put the
qualities together into a sequence and regard it as the "history" of the name as it were the
name rather than the sellers holding it that is responsible to the qualities. That probably looks
strange. However history is the great creation of the people in the economy as history functions
as signalling and sorting instruments so as to improve social welfare if the people believe in the
12A more detailed process of information di¤usion can be as follows. A widget is experience good. After buying
and consuming it, the buyer knows its quality privately. As this knowledge is not directly observable to others
even ex post, the attempt to contract upon it cannot overcome the problem of incentivizing the buyer to tell the
truth. However the tricky thing is that if nothing a¤ects his interest, as a human being the buyer likes to share
honestly his experience of buying and consuming the widget with others whenever possible, and his audience, as
human beings, like to share what they have heard with others. So at the end of a period, all buyers and sellers
of this and the next periods know the quality of the widget.
13In the rst period young sellers do not have the option of buying an existing name.
14Hereinafter I use term "buy new names at price 0" to mean forming new names.
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meaning of history. The basic model of the paper is to show that point. In fact in the names
markets, trading names is actually trading their histories as names are totally characterized
by their histories. On the other hand, to trade histories people must nd something to bag
the occurrences composing the histories. Names are the best candidate. Using names to carry
and embody histories facilitates personalizing organizations psychologically, which facilitates the
acceptance and di¤usion of the belief in the meaning of history, since generally natural persons
are represented by their names. Thus hereinafter history and name are substitutable to each
other.
As the quality of all widgets produced in period t are known to t+1 buyers and sellers, they
know the whole history of all names at date t + 1. Below I use "s" to denote success (a useful
widget is produced) and "f" to failure (a useless widget is produced). And a typical history is
denoted by "h". Then generically h is a sequence consisting of s and f, such as s, sf, sssfetc.
And sn is used to denote the history consisting of n consecutive sand the empty history
(for new names) is denoted by "". Denote by H t the set of all histories in date t + 1name
market, or the set of all histories with the length no bigger than t. For example, H1 = f; s; fg;
H2 = H1 [ fss; sf; fsg etc.
And names (histories) will have the following dynamics. If an h-names is held by a good
seller, then with probability q, he will succeed in producing a useful widget and the h-name
becomes an hs-name; with probablity 1  q, he will fail and the name becomes an hf -name. If
an h-names is held by a bad seller, then he will denitely fail and the name denitely becomes
an hf -name.
I use the concept of competitive equilibrium, which consist of prices and decisions. The prices
for widgets are denoted by wht and the prices for names are denoted by pht, where subscription h
represents the history of the names and t represents date. Only sellers have important decisions
to make. First they decide whether to produce, with eBt=eGt 2 [0; 1] denoting the probability
(share) of B/G-sellers engaging production at date t. Then they decide which names to buy. I
use ht to denote the share of good sellers among h-names holders in period t. Let ht denote
the mass of h-names in the name market at date t. The total sale value of names in date t
name market, which is also the transfer from t-generation of sellers to t   1-generation ones, is
Vt =
P
h2Ht 1
htpht. Then fpht;whtgh;t and feBt=eGt;htgh;t constitute a competitive equilibrium
if and only if
Condition 1 Given the price sequences fphtgh;t and fwhtgh;t; the optimal decisions of sellers at
date t are eBt=eGt and ht:
Condition 2 Given the decisions feBt=eGt;htgh;t; pht clears the market of h-names at date t.
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Condition 3 Given the decisions feBt=eGt;htgh;t; wht clears the market of widgets produced
with h-names at date t.
Condition 4 (No Ponzi): limt!1 rtVt = 0:
As the production technology bears stringent capacity constraint and buyers are more nu-
merous than sellers, the prices clearing the widget market must be such that expectedly buyers
are indi¤erent in buying widgets or not. Therefore, buyers have to pay the expected value of the
widgets and condition 3 becomes
wht = E(vjh; t) = qhtv (1)
No Ponzi deserves more explanation. Let St be the total return of period t sellers and t the
total prot of the sellers from selling the widgets. As sellers return equal the sum of the prot
from the widgets and the capital gain from the names, we have St = t   Vt 1 + rVt: Then if
and only if No Ponzi hold, we have
X
t1
rtSt =
X
t1
rtt (2)
Equation (2), equivalent to No Ponzi, says that the sellers in the economy can borrow and
lend, but in net the outsiders do not give money to them. Thus No Ponzi is designed to exclude
the situation in which in each period all sellers pick easy big money by just buying and selling
names, which are actually no more than pieces of papers.
Here I focus on "stationary equilibria", where fphtg, fwhtg, eBt=eGt and ht do not depend
on time t. Stationary equilibria describes what happens in the long-run where all nite histories
are present. And we will see that in both the basic model and the extension there are only nite
states of names and the dynamics are Markovian transformation among the states.
As sellers can create any new names costlessly, p = 0:
The purpose of the basic model is to show that organizations, represented by their names, do
derive reputation from their history even though it was created by the sellers that have nothing
to do with the current sellers holding the names, in the socially best equilibrium, that is, the
equilibrium in which bad sellers are excluded to the most extent. However, before going to gure
out the socially best equilibrium, as a benchmark, I demonstrate what happens if names cannot
derive reputation from history.
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3 Benchmark: "History is Bunk"  Henry Ford
In this section I will consider a benchmark in which organizations do not derive reputation from
history. Suppose that the people in the economy are realisticist. As Henry Ford, they believe,
correctively in the end, that histories are attributed to the people passing away and mean nothing
to the current people. Then in this realistic world, organizations cannot derive reputation from
history; actually no history is even composed as the realistic people keep the occurrences of
di¤erent dates separate. And no young sellers would like to pay for the existing names. Notice
that at the end of each period some sellers establish (personal) reputation of being good after
the buyers know that their widgets are useful. But this reputation is useless. The reputed sellers
do not produce anymore; and the reputation established by them die with them retiring so that
in the next period the problem due to adverse selection is as serious as in this period. What
happens then in the benchmark?
Proposition 1 : If people believe that history is bunk, then in all equilibria widgetsprice w = c
and social surplus is 0.
Proof. : First the following prole of prices and decisions is an equilibrium. No transaction
happens in the name market and namesprice is 0, and the price of widgets is w = c; sellers
of both types enter production with some probability, in such a mix that the expected value of
the widget is c: Then given the prices, the return of both types of sellers is w   c = 0 so that
they are indi¤erent and their entry decision is optimal; given the decision, by (1) the price of
the widgets is c; and surely the price of names is 0 as no young sellers want to pay for existing
names.
Here I prove no other kinds of equilibria exist in the situation. Consider the price of widgets,
w: If w < c; no sellers want to produce. Suppose that w > c. Then sellers get positive return
and all sellers, both bad and good, will engage in production. Then by (1) the price of widgets
is w = qv < c; a contradiction to the supposition that w > c. Thus w = c in all equilibria.
In the equilibria, sellers get return 0, and buyers get 0 surplus expectedly as always. So the
social surplus is 0.
In this realistic world, B-sellers enter production to the degree that all social surplus generated
by good sellers is dissipated up. This is very ine¢ cient. The reason is no way to use the ex
post information about the widgetsquality. Or in other words, the reputation established by
successful sellers is personal and dies with them retiring. The ine¢ ciency is exactly the cost of
establishing the reputation. If it dies with the establishers, as what happens in this benchmark,
then each generation needs to pay their own cost, leading to a huge cost replication. To improve
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over it, the economy does not want the reputation to be personal, dieing with the establishers,
but want it to survive their irresistable death. How to do it? Attach the reputation not to
natural persons, but to the organizations run by them, that is, make organization derive and
bear reputation, which prerequires the people believe in the meaning of history. Then the
question is, if that is possible, what can be achieved at best? Can all bad sellers be excluded,
that is, the rst best be obtained? That is the topic for the next section.
4 The Social Best for the Basic Model
Suppose that the people in the economy do believe in the meaning of histories to the current
rms. Especially, they believe that the glorious history implies the current excellence for rms
as for natural persons. If the belief is rationalized, organizations (rms) do derive reputation
from their histories, which function as instruments to signal and sort out good sellers. What is
the socially best equilibrium in this case? For this question, rst let us construct an equilibrium.
Single Name Equilibrium (SNE): An equilibrium is as follows. There are two kinds of
names, new names and success names, denoted by  and s respectively. If a  name succeeds,
the name becomes an s-name; while if it fails, it remains a worthless name and is replaced by
another new name in the next period (which is simplied as "it remains a new name"). If a
s name succeeds, it remains a s name; while if it fails, it becomes a new name (being destroyed
and replaced by a new name). The dynamics are illustrated as follows:
Figure 1: the dynamics in SNE
The prices for SNE are ps = ;ws = qv and w = c: The decisions are s = 1 and  =
c
qv
; eG = 1 and eB =
(1 q)(qv c)
(1 )c : Good sellers hold both types of names while bad sellers enter
only through new names. To show the prole of the prices and decisions do form an equilibrium,
it su¢ ces to verify conditions 1-4 are to be satised. Obviously, (1), equivalent to condition 3,
is satised. No Ponzi is satised obviously since Vt = q15:
For condition 1, it is shown that both types of sellers are indi¤erent in buying any names and
that good sellers get return RG = rq and bad sellers RB = 0. For good sellers buying s names,
15The only valuable names are s names, with mass q and price :
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the prot from selling the widgets is ws   c = ; the capital gain from buying and selling the
names is  ps + r[qps + (1  q) 0] =  (1  rq): Then the return that is the sum of the prot
and the capital gain is RG = rq: For good sellers buying  names, the prot is w   c = 0;
the capital gain is rqps = rq: Then the return is also rq: Hence good sellers are indi¤erent in
buying any names. For bad sellers buying s names, the prot is ; but they incur capital loss
 as denitely failing. Then the return is RB = 0: If they buy  names, both the prot and the
capital gain are 0 and consequently the return is 0. Hence bad sellers are also indi¤erent. Then
the decisions of buying names are justied. Since RG > 0; optimally eG = 1 while since RB = 0;
any eB 2 [0; 1] is weakly optimal and the value is decided by condition  = cqv : As there are
only q s names but  good sellers, (1 q) good sellers use  names. These are only c
qv
of the
total  names by denition of . Thus (1 q)(qv c)c bad sellers enter through  names, which
determines eB =
(1 q)(qv c)
(1 )c :
For condition 2, given that G-sellers hold both types of names, the market clearing price for
s names must be set to make good sellers indi¤erent in buying any names. Thus  ps + ws  
c+ rqps =  p + w   c+ rqps ) ps = ws   c = , as specied by the prole.
Summarily, the prole of decisions and prices really forms an equilibrium. The equilibrium
is called "single name equilibrium" (SNE) as there is only one state of non-new names.
In SNE, personalization of names is justied as good names, implied by good histories, are
only held by good sellers and have averagely better current performance. In SNE, RG = rq:
Contrasting with the benchmark, the social e¢ ciency is improved.
The question is, can we improve over SNE? It looks that we have many reasons to anticipate
an equilibrium better than it. For example, in SNE ater a success, s-names becomes s2-names
that have the same price as s-names. But it seems to be better if the price of s2-names were higher
so as to be farther from the danger of being destroyed by failures. For another example, in SNE
s-names are destroyed into new names by just one failure. As non-new names are useful to siganl
and sort good sellers, why not let s-names die after two or even more failures? More generally
it looks like that if in an equilibrium there were more kinds of non-new names for signalling and
sorting, then there would be more scope for separating and thus the outcome would be better.
Surprisingly these kinds of considerations do not not true! The simple equilibrium, SNE, already
reaches the maximum social welfare. For proving this, I need rst to show that the prices of
name cannot go to innity.
Lemma 1 No Ponzi implies that ph  1 r for any h in any equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
12
Then I can prove the optimality of SNE.
Proposition 2 SNE generates the maximum social welfare among all equilibria.
Proof. For the proof, rst notice that in any equilibrium bad sellers get 0 (the reserve prot).
And buyers averagely obtain 0 since they paid the prices equaling the expected value of the
widgets. Therefore social welfare is measured by the return of good sellers for any equilibrium.
In SNE the return of good sellers is rq: Thus to prove the proposition it su¢ ces to show
that in any equilibrium RG  rq:
Given an equilibrium. By lemma 1 above P = supfphjall hg is well dened. For any " such
that 0 < " < c; there exist an h name such that ph > P ": First not all h names are bought
by bad sellers. Otherwise, they are a signal of bad sellers. Then wh = 0: The return of the bad
sellers buying the names is  ph+wh  c+ rphf   ph  c+ rP <  P +   c+ rP < 0: Then
bad sellers would not buy the names, contradicting with the supposition that only bad sellers
buy the names.
Thus h names are bought by good sellers at least partly. Then let us come to calculate
the return of good sellers buying the names. It is  ph + wh   c + r[qphs + (1   q)phf ] 
 ph + wh   c + r[qP + (1   q)phf ] = rq(wh   c) + rq(P   ph) + (1   q)( ph + wh   c +
rphf ) + q(1   r)( ph + wh   c): Let us check the last sum term by term. For the rst two
terms, by (1) wh   c = hqv   c  : P   ph < ": As to the third and the fourth terms,
consider what bad sellers get if they buy h names also. Their return is  ph +wh   c+ rphf ;
which is no bigger than 0 in equilibrium. Thus the third term is non-positive while the fourth
term  ph +wh   c   rphf  0: Therefore the return of good sellers buying h names is no
bigger than rq + rq" for any " such that 0 < " < c: Let " goes to zero, we end the proof.
For the intuition of proposition 2 let us consider the extreme case where r = 1 and ph = P:
The return of the good sellers buying h names equals the sum of the prot wh   c plus the
capital gain. As the price of buying them is already at the highest level there is no capital gain
in any case. And when the good sellers fail, the capital loss ph phf cannot be smaller than the
prot (wh   c) in order to deter bad sellers. This loss happens with probability 1  q: Therefore
the return is no bigger than q(wh   c)  q:
In the basic model the history of a rm (name) is attributed to the past sellers nothing
substantial connecting with the rm now. However allowing rms to derive reputation from
their histories improve social e¢ ciency, with RG increased from 0 in the benchmark to rq here.
And I have shown that the simple equilibrium, SNE, implements the second best. Moreover,
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though rms do not have "types" here, in SNE the reputation does go up after a success and
down after a failure, similar to the reputation of natural persons. All these are nice.
However two motivations push me to seek a more "complete" theory. First, the dynamics in
SNE is not so realistic. It has no memory. A name having one million consecutive successes has
the same value as that having only one success, and is destroyed by one failure alone as the later.
In real world, the two names are quite di¤erent. Equivalently the history of reputed names is
too short, just one period. In our real life we can see hundreds years of old brandnames and
people remember their whole history, not just the history of the latest decade. Second, the basic
model confers upon ethic no role in the reputation of organizations. Nevertheless in real life ethic
is indeed a part of the reputation as people do impose ethical evaluations upon organizations.
Recently, Financial Time, one of most inuencial papers, reported ten most ethically perceived
brands in France, Germany, Spain, UK and US, which comes from GfK NOPs survey in the
respective countries16. Especially one ethical consideration is "fair trading", which is about the
pricing behaviour of rms. Thus I am seeking a theory of organizationsreputation in which the
equilibrium dynamics has long memory and there is a role for this "fair trading". Another nice
thing of the basic model is that a small extension on it brings about such a theory, which is the
topic of the next section.
5 Extension: Ethic and Long Memory
An extension of the basic model is made in the section to generate a role of ethic in organizations
reputation and a dynamics having long memory. For that purpose I only need to incorporate
another dimension of private information to sellers. Then ethic are introduced and the dynamics
are studied. In the end some socially best equilibria are constructed.
5.1 The Second Dimension of Private Information
In the basic model the only private information of sellers is their type, which decides the prior
probability of their widget. In the extension sellers are assumed to have ex post private informa-
tion as well. After a widget is produced, the seller privately gets a signal, n (nice) or u (useless),
about its quality, according to the following distribution:
Pr(njv) = 1; Pr(nj0) = 1   and Pr(uj0) =  < 1:
Therefore here  measures the preciseness of the signal. And actually the basic model is
a special case of the general model in which  = 0 (ex post signals are uninformative). The
16See "Ethical consumption makes mark on branding", Financial Times, pp24, Tuesday, Feb., 20, 2007.
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distribution means that sellers are over-optimistic about their widget. If it is useful, they know
that; even if it is actually useless, they still think it is useful with probability 1  : The necessity
of this second dimension of private information to the role of ethic will be proven later when I
show that ethic, as in the sense below, make no di¤erence if  = 0:
Then timing for each period is then as follows. First young sellers are born and know their
type. Then they buy names in the name market. Subsequently they produce widgets and get
ex post signals before trading with buyers in the widget market. In the end they sell their name
in the name market to the next young sellers.
5.2 Ethic and Social Custom
ethic are the propositions about "right" or "wrong". Notice that if sellers get signal u, they
know denitely the widget is useless as Pr(0ju) = 1: But they still want to sell their widget at
high prices. However this behavior is attributed to names by the people in the economy.
Denition 1 ethic of Names: a name (not a seller) is considered as cheating if it sets a price
p > v = 0 for the useless widget. A cheating nameis a name ever cheating before.
The economy, like our world, holds that cheating is wrong for a name.
To make the ethic have a bite, the wrong behaviour, cheating must be punished, which does
have economic signicance. In the economy, bad sellers survive only through cheating. Hence
punishing it helps to drive them out of production. Notice that the ethic are upon names, rather
than the sellers. Then the way to punish cheating, as in our world, is by distrusting the cheating
names17! Thus the economy could hold the belief that cheating names keep producing useless
widgets and cheating by setting a positive price for them. However this is not what happens
in the socially optimal equilibria. The belief destroys cheating names resale value, which is
what we want to punish cheating. Nevertheless, if the value is low the threat of losing it cannot
stop cheating, hence not conducive to exclude bad sellers, but does destroy name in equilibrium,
hence lowering social e¢ ciency as names are the instruments signalling good sellers. Therefore
in the socially best equilibrium, only the names with high enough resale values are destroyed if
ever cheating. Then in equilibrium path cheating is deterred and the names are still alive.
The highest price acceptable by buyers is vh = E(vjG; n) = qv
q+(1 q)(1 ) : Thus the most a
seller can get from cheating is vh: The resale value of an h-name after a failure is phf ; which is
17This idea of letting folk theory work for names rather than real players with the names is attributed to Kreps
(1990), while the innovation of the paper here is to incorporate into this pure adverse selection framework an
element of moral hazard through "ethics", for the purpose of applying the Krepsian idea.
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discounted r: The threat of losing the resale value can stop cheating if and only if rphf  vh.
The argument of the last paragraph implies the following social custom:
Denition 2 Social Custom: a cheating h-name with resale value phf  vhr keeps producing
useless widgets and cheating by setting a positive price for them.
In the basic model, both types of sellers get same prot from the widgets if holding same
h-names. The reason why good sellers outbid bad ones in bidding some good names is that the
former can get more capital gain from reselling the names as they succeed with bigger probability
and the resale value is higher after a success than after a failure. This e¤ect is called value-add
e¤ect. In the extension when the ethic and the custom are introduce, buying names with resale
value phf  vhr is to commit to pricing honestly ex ante, especially setting price 0 when getting
signal u. This e¤ect is called commitment e¤ect. As ex ante only good sellers are willing to make
such a commitment, commitment e¤ect provides another way in which good sellers outbid bad
sellers. That is the intuition of how introducing ethic improves social e¢ ciency. The argument
leads to the following denition:
Denition 3 The names with resale value phf  vhr are called commitment names. Otherwise,
they are "non-commitment" names.
Only good sellers want to buy commitment names.
5.3 Necessity of Ex Post Information and Long Memory
To show the necessity of ex post information and the long memory of dynamics, I need to decide
rst the value dynamics of the reputation in equilibria. The dynamics are decided by the two
equilibrium conditions (E1): good sellers get RG from any names they buy in equilibrium path;
and (E2): bad sellers get return 0 in equilibrium path and non-positive return in non-equilibrium
path18.
Dynamics: For any h-names, the return of bad sellers buying them is ph+wh c+rphf  0
by (E2). As wh  0; we have
18Suppose otherwise they get positive return in some equilibrium. Then all bad sellers would enter production
in each period, and the social surplus is qv   c < 0 by assumption 1. By No Ponzi condition in whole sellers
return comes from the social surplus generated by them. Hence no positive return is possible, contradicting with
the supposition that bad sellers get positive return.
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phf  ph + c
r
(3)
If some h-names are only bought by bad sellers, then wh = 0 and (E2) implies
phf =
ph + c
r
(4)
If h-names are bought by good sellers, what happens depends on whether the names are
commitment names. Suppose rst that they are not ( phf < v
h
r
). Then RG =  ph + wh  
c + r[qphs + (1   q)phf ] =  ph + wh   c + rphf + rq(phs   phf ). Then two cases are needed to
be considered. If ph   rphf <  (= qv   c); bad sellers buy the h-names in equilibrium19. By
condition (E2)  ph+wh  c+ rphf = 0: Then RG = rq(phs  phf ). If ph  rphf  ; then h = 1
and wh = qv20: Then RG =  (ph      rphf ) + rq(phs   phf ): Let h =: maxfph   rphf   ; 0g:
Then the two cases are combined together into
phs = phf +
RG
rq
+
1
rq
h (5)
(3), (4) and (5) actually describe the dynamics in the basic model. Thus if the dynamics are
decided by the three equations, then proposition 2 holds true.
Suppose then that the h-names are commitment names ( phf  vhr ). When good sellers
holding the names get signal u, with probability (1   q) ; they will set price 0 honestly so
as to keep the names resale value phf . When they get signal n, ex ante with probability
q + (1   q)(1   ); in equilibrium they set price vh = E(vjG; n) with probability 121. However
with probability Pr(0jG; n) = (1 q)(1 )
q+(1 q)(1 ) their widget is actually useless and the commitment
names are destroyed since price vh is regarded as a cheating price; while with the complement
probability, the widget is really useful and the names are sold at price phs: Then RG =  ph  
c+ [q + (1  q)(1  )][vh + q
q+(1 q)(1 )rphs] + (1  q) [0 + rphf ])
 ph +  + rqphs + r(1  q)phf = RG (6)
19Otherwise wh = qv and the return of bad sellers buying the h-names is ph+wh c+rphf =  ph++rphf > 0;
Thus bad sellers should buy the names.
20Suppose otherwise h < 1: Then wh < qv. The return of bad sellers buying the h-names is  ph + wh   c+
rphf <  ph +  + rphf  0: That means they should not buy the names, contradictory with h < 1:
21Suppose otherwise, to be concerned with keeping the resale value, they set price 0 with some positive
probability . Then conditional on price 0 and the h-names, the expected value of the widgets is positive
(E(vjh;w = 0) _ h(q + (1  q)(1  ))  vh): In the competitive market, the buyers will push the price of the
widgets to equal the expected value, which contradictory with the supposition that the price of the widgets is 0.
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Denote byH the set of all possible histories including innite ones, that is,H = f; s; f; ss; sf; fs; ff; :::g =S
t1
H t: Summarily, the equilibrium dynamics are a function p : H  ! R+ [ 0 such that p = 0
and (3); and that when h-names are only bought by bad sellers (4) holds; and that when good
sellers also buy h-names, (5) if phf < v
h
r
; and (6) if phf  vhr :
Notice that SNE in the last section is still an equilibrium here in which the ethic have
no bite. The questions are whether and when ethic make di¤erence in equilibrium, which is
equivalent to get an equilibrium with RG > rq by proposition 2. In this subsection I get some
necessary conditions for such an equilibrium to exist. Then in the next subsection I construct
fully equilibria in which ethic do make di¤erence.
Check the proof of lemma 1 and nd that the proof does not depend on any specic dynamics.
Therefore lemma 2 still holds in the extension. So P = supfphjall hg is well dened for any given
equilibrium. If in the equilibrium RG > rq; the P  vhr : Otherwise there are no commitment
names and by proposition 2 RG  rq. And the upper bound is actually related to the social
welfare:
Lemma 2 In equilibria where RG > rq; P   RG1 rq r(1 q) :
Proof. See appendix.
The lemma actually gives out the necessity of ex post information for ethic to make di¤erence.
Corollary 1 There exists equilibria where ethic makes di¤erence only if  >  c =:
(qv r)(1 rq)
r(1 q)[qv (1 rq)] >
0 and  > (1 r)v
r(1 rq) :
Proof. : If the equilibrium exists, then in it P   RG
1 rq r(1 q) by lemma 2 and P  v
h
r
: Thus such
a equilibrium exists only if  RG
1 r+r(1 q)(1 )  v
h
r
: As in the equilibriumRG > rq;  RG1 r+r(1 q)(1 ) 
vh
r
)  rq
1 r+r(1 q)(1 ) >
vh
r
,    c: As qv > ; qv   r > 0 and qv   (1   rq) > 0: Hence
 c > 0: The second part of the lemma is derived from the requirement that  c < 1:
The corollary says only if the sellersex post knowledge about the quality is precise enough,
that is,  is big enough, ethic can make any di¤erence. Especially in the basic model where
 = 0; there is no role for ethic. From the point of nominal view, if sellers do not have "precise"
knowledge about the quality of the widgets ( = 0), it would be "unfair" to say that they
cheat intentionally by setting a positive price for useless widgets. Therefore the ethic based
on such a denition of "cheating" is not "just". It is amazing to notice that this simple ethical
consideration actually has economical ground that if  = 0; the ethic cannot make any di¤erence.
Notice that in equilibria where RG > rq there are new names. The reason is that the
equilibria have commitment names and they are destroyed into new names with probability
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(1  q)(1  ): From new names there are s-names and f -names one period later. By (3), rpf 
c < qv < vh: Then new names are not commitment names. And  = maxf0  rpf   ; 0g = 0:
Thus by (5), RG = rq(ps   pf ): We come to the problem of long memory of the dynamics in
equilibria where RG > rq.
Lemma 3 ps < v
h
r
in equilibria where RG > rq.
Proof. Suppose otherwise ps  vhr : Then ps   pf  v
h c
r
; which implies RG  q(vh   c): On the
other hand, by lemma 2 RG   (1  rq   r(1  q))P +    (1  rq   r(1  q))vh +  as in
the equilibria P  vh
r
: Combining the two inequalities, we have  (1   rq   r(1  q))vh +  
q(vh   c) ,  + qc  (q + 1   rq   r(1   q))vh: Notice that [q + (1   q)(1   )]vh = qv and
q+1  rq  r(1  q) = q+ (1  q)(1  ) + (1  r)[q+ (1  q) ] > q+ (1  q)(1  ): Therefore
+ qc  (q+1  rq  r(1  q))vh ) + qc > qv , qv  c+ qc > qv , qc > c; a contradiction.
Corollary 2 The dynamics have long memory in equilibria where ethic make di¤erence.
Proof. In the equilibria the highest value P  vh
r
: And we know pf < v
h
r
: By the lemma
maxfps; pfg < vhr : Thus the value cannot stop increasing after one period in the equilibria,
which means that the dynamics features necessarily long memory for at least two periods.
In the next subsection SBE is fully constructed to show that the equilibria where ethic make
di¤erence do exist.
5.4 Socially Best Equilibrium (SBE) in the Extension
Suppose some h names take the highest value P: Then the names cannot only be bought by
bad sellers22 and are commitment names23. Thus by (6) RG =  P +  + rqphs + r(1  q)phf :
To maximize RG; we want to increase phs and phf as possible as we can. Therefore in SBE,
phs = phf = P; if ph = P: The intuition is that for the commitment names, bad sellers are
deterred o¤ buying the names not by capital loss (value-add e¤ect), but by the fact that then
they have set the honest price (commitment e¤ect). Therefore we do not want to lower down the
namesvalue after a failure, as that would make the names vulnerable to be killed by failures.
Thus RG =  (1  rq   r(1  q))P +  in SBE.
22Otherwise phf =
ph+c
r > P; contradictory with the denition of P .
23Otherwise by (5), as in the proof of lemma 3, phs  ph + ph r > P , contradictory to the denition of P .
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In the subsection, to make computations and denotations easier and as r < 1 does not
matter for the construction of equilibria, I consider only the extreme case where r = 124: And
let  =: (1  q)(1  ): Then vh = qv
q+
and the condition in corollary 1 is  > 
1 qv
h = (1  )vh:
And RG =  P +  in SBE. So the problem of nding SBE becomes:
Problem 1 (*) minP s.t. P  vh; and P  ph for all h; and the dynamics.
Thus the dynamics in the SBE look like as follows. Beginning from new names with p = 0,
the value is increased according to the dynamics given in the last subsection. Then whenever
the value of some names is beyond vh; we want the value to be the highest value P , not varying
with respect to additional successes or failures (phs = phf = ph) any more. And we want the
di¤erence P   vh as small as possible (up to the constraint that it is non-negative).
The names with the ceiling value are called ceiling names. Thus in SBE, if h-names are
ceiling names, then so are hh0-names for any h0 and only the ceiling names have commitment
e¤ect. The interesting things are what are the rst ceiling names and how many stages after
which new names could become ceiling names. Then we have the following denition.
Denition 4 The Height of an equilibrium is dened by ns = minfnj ph  vh for some h 2
Hng:
For any equilibrium where RG > q; there are h-names such that ph  vh: Thus ns is well
dened. And by corollary 2 ns  2 in such a equilibrium. I am going to nd SBE with the
smallest height.
Some SBE could be very "strange". For example, suppose c = v
h
N
for some natural number
N: Then SBE would be as follows. New names are only held by bad sellers. After the failure, the
names become f -names with value pf = c. Then these f -names are only bought by bad sellers
again and get pff = 2c. Similarly fm-names are only bought by bad sellers until m = N: Then
fN -names become commitment names as pfN = Nc = vh and are only held by good sellers. As
P = vh; an optimal solution is found.
The dynamics are very improbable to happen in our world due to two problems, both related
to the belief driving the dynamics. Firstly, in the dynamics buyers believe that the names in the
rst N stages (from new names to fN 1) are the hallmark of bad sellers, whereas that the names
in the N +1th stage are the hallmark of good sellers, a U-turn about the namesmeaning, which
24More precisely, the case of r colse to but still less than 1. As everything is continuous in r below, I just
consider what happens for r = 1:
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is very improbable in our world. The second is that in the equilibrium only bad sellers produce
in the rst N stages, which is social worst ! Suppose the stationary equilibrium is evolved from
what happens in the nite periods, as most of the social beliefs are taught by and inherited from
our parents. In the rst N periods the people would avoid the social worst situation by forming
other social beliefs. Thus the strange dynamics can never emerge from the evolution. The rst
argument is actually explained by the second one, which leads to the following assumption:
Assumption 3: In each nite period the social e¢ ciency is maximized given the names
available then and the stationary equilibria are evolved out when the beliefs persist in the way
of education and inheritance.
Then such stationary equilibria are called "Evolvable Equilibria".
For each period, the people try to make most of the names (histories) existing then to drive
out bad seller. Therefore want phf  maxfph ; 0g25 to deter bad sellers through capital loss, or
want phf  vh to generate commitment e¤ect to deter them. Therefore the assumption implies
that in the evolvable equilibria if ph < vh   c; which implies phf  ph + c < vh by (3), then
phf  maxfph   ; 0g: Especially pf = 0: Then RG = qps and RG > q , ps > :
Lemma 3 says the namesvalue cannot stop increasing at ps in SBE where RG > q: In the
second stage there are s2 and sf -names. The proof of lemma 4 actually shows that ps pf < vh c:
Given pf = 0; that means ps < vh   c: Therefore in the evolvable equilibria psf  ps    < vh
and only s2-names could be ceiling names. Then two questions arise.
(Q1): Are s2-names actually ceiling names under some conditions? Or are two stages of
evolution (ns = 2) su¢ cient to get a SBE? And
(Q2): Is ns = 2 always su¢ cient to get a SBE? Or more generally what is the upper bound
of smallest heights of SBE in all cases? If the upper bound is a nite number N , then we know
that the value of the reputation stop increasing after N stages in any case.
I discuss the two questions one by one.
For the rst question, suppose ps2  vh and are the rst ceiling names. To nd SBE I
need to minimize ps2 subject to ps2  vh. Consider what constraints imposed by the dynamics.
As psf < vh, (5) holds for s-names. Thus ps2 = psf +
RG
q
+ 1
q
maxfps      psf ; 0g: Then for
psf  ps   ; ps2 is decreasing with respect to psf while for psf  ps   ; it is increasing. Thus
ps2 is minimized at psf = ps    with the minimum value being
25By setting phf  maxfph   ; 0g; bad sellers are driven out by the h-names to the most degree. If ph  ;
they are excluded totally from buying the names; if ph < ; good sellers buy the names to the most degree as
h =
wh
qv =
ph phf+c
qv  ph+cqv :
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ps2 = 2ps    (7)
And since ps2 = P; RG =  ps2 + : On the other hand RG = qps: Combine them, we have
 ps2 +  = qps (8)
From (7) and (8), if s2-names are actually ceiling names, then the minimized ps2 =
2 q
q+2
: If
  q + 2
2  q v
h (9)
then the minimized ps2  vh and we do get a solution of problem (*) with the objective P =
2 q
q+2
: In the solution ps =
ps2+
2
= 1+
q+2
 >  and thus RG = qps > q, which means ethic do
improve social e¢ ciency. And psf = ps   = (1 q)q+2 : In SBE p(s2h) = ps2 for any h if the price
of the widget is honesty. To fully decide a SBE it su¢ ces to decide p(sfh) for all h-names in the
way consistent with the dynamics given in the last subsection and assumption 3.
That actually has some degree of freedom. If psf =
(1 q)
q+2
   ,   2 q
3 q ; I set psff = 0
and psfs = ps: As psff < vh; the applicable dynamics equation is (5). It holds for the value set
here as psfs   psff = ps = RGq +
maxfpsf ;0g
q
. The whole dynamics in the SBE is illustrated as
follows.
Figure 2: the dynamics in SBE if   2 q
3 q :
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On the other hand, if psf > ; I set psff = psf and psfs = P = ps2 . Again by the set-up,
sf -names are non-commitment names. Thus the applicable dynamics equation is also (5). Now
sf = maxfpsf    psff ; 0g = 0: (5) is equivalent to psfs  psff = ps , ps2   psf = ps , ps2 =
ps + psf , ps2 = 2ps   , which is (7). The dynamics are illustrated below.
Figure 3: the dynamics in SBE if  > 2 q
3 q
Summarily we have the following:
Proposition 3 If (9) holds true, the socially best equilibria are as gured out above, in which
ps =
1+
q+2
, psf = ps  and ps2 = ps+psf : And if   2 q3 q the dynamics are illustrated in gure
2 and if otherwise are in gure 3. In both dynamics, phs  ps  phf ; with the strict inequality
holding except for new names or commitment names and phf = 0 if ph  . The equilibria are
better than SNE.
The features that phs  ps  phf and phf = 0 if ph   are natural for the reputation
dynamics of natural persons since the successes and failures are used to Bayesian updating the
estimation of the personstypes26. Amazingly, the dynamics of organizationsreputation also
bear the features, which surely reinforces the personalization of organizations.
So far, I have shown that ns = 2 is su¢ cient if (9) holds and thus answered question (Q1).
Now I come to question (Q2), how many stages of evolution are necessarily needed to get a SBE?
26see also note 1.
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If (9) does not holds, then minimum ps2 is smaller than vh: That, however, does not necessarily
imply that ns = 2 is not su¢ cient since I can set psf < ps   27 to increase ps2 according to (5).
The upper bound is achieved at psf = 0, satisfying, by (5) for s-names, qps2+ ps = RG = qps.
On the other hand RG =  ps2 +  if ps2  vh and reaches the ceiling level. Combine the
equations together. Then the maximum value of s2-names consistent with the supposition that
they are ceiling names is ps2 = +q2+q : And

+q2+q
 vh ,   ( + q2 + q)vh; while the
necessary condition in corollary 1 is  > (1 )vh:We know that +q2+q = q2+(1 q2)(1 ) >
1   : Therefore If (1  )vh <  <  + q2 + q, ns  3 is necessary for a SBE.
How many stages are necessary in general? We have the following proposition, the proof of
which is put in the appendix:
Proposition 4 If (1  )vh <  < minf1   + (1 q)
q N 1 ; q
N+1+(1  qN+1)(1  )]vh, the height of
SBE is bigger than N + 1. The lower surplus generated by average good sellers () is, the more
stages are needed for names to evolve from new to the ceiling names.
As the rms in the high end of markets generally produce higher social surplus than those in
the low end, the proposition predicts that the former establishes fully the reputation than the
later. This prediction is empirically testable.
6 Empirical Relevance and Conclusion
Reputation is important capital of our world as it helps to relieve the many problems due to
asymmetric information. Surely reputation is built by natural persons, who are destined to die.
So there arises a problem. Does the reputation built by them die with them? If they do and the
new generation has to rebuild reputation of their own, societies have to bear the replicative cost
(direct cost of the invested resources and indirect cost of ine¢ ciency due to lack of reputation).
Therefore any societies would have interest to avoid this cost replication. As discussed in the
paper here, the societies can achieve this by cleverly attaching reputation not to natural persons
that are destined to die, but to organizations that technically could live forever.
The mechanism depends on the existence of names market, the market for buying and selling
reputation. When attempting to apply the mechanism into the realities, we would ask the
question: does this market really exist in our world? Or is the mechanism nothing but a ction
of economists?
27By assumption 3, in the evolvable equilibria psf  ps   :
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It does! The closest example is the merger and acquisition (M&A) market. Physical capital
could be bought and human capital could be hired. Then why do acquirer rms want to buy
acquiree rms as a whole? And why does the former pay a lot more than what is needed to
buy all independently indentiable assets, both tangible and intangible, of the later? There
must be some thing existing sorely in the whole, not among the parts, that the acquirers want
to buy and have to pay. This thing is exactly the reputation of the acqirees as a whole28. Its
value, referred as "goodwill" in M&A accounting, if measured in the "top-down" perspective",
equals the di¤erence of the price of the acquirees minus the sum of fair values of all their
independently indentiable assets29. Moreover, one of the two core components of goodwill30
could be "the preexisting goodwill that was ... acquired by it (the acqiree) in a previous business
combination"31. Thus after a M&A, the reputation of the acquirees, as measured by "goodwill",
is indeed kept in the acquirer as a whole. Take AllianceBernstein L.P. as example. When
acquiring SCB Inc. on October 2000, it paid approximately $3bn as goodwill. As reported
in the condensed consolidated statement of nancial conditions as of September 30, 2006, the
goodwill is kept almost the same ($2,893m). Furthermore, this M&A market is not conned for
economical entities; it could involve any transactions in which entities as a whole are traded. For
example, Manchester United, a famous UK football club, was bought by US tycoon Malcolm
Glazer. In a word, in the elds where entities can be traded as a whole, we can expect that the
literal mechanism fences reputation o¤ the attack from the death of natural persons.
How about other elds of human life in which such trading of entities as a whole does not
exist explicitly, like schools? Could the mechanism be applied there? I think the market for
reputation is still there, but in implicit form. Take school as an example and consider the
following model of schools reputation. Each teacher works for two periods (young and old)
and each school consists of a young and an old teacher, with teacher change observable to the
schoolscustomers (students and their parents). Teachersquality, high or low, is not observable
to the customers, but to the old teachers in charge of recruiting the junior from PhDs. Besides
teaching the students, teachers enjoy some business called "research", in pursuing which strong
complementarity is present. PhDs want to enter reputed schools that charge high tuition fees
and pay high wages. It is straightforward that in equilibrium high quality young teachers enter
reputed schools which is under the control of high quality old ones. Here in the job market the
potential young teachers (PhDs) bid for reputation, nevertheless not with money as in the literal
28Another possibility is that the acquirers pay a premium for the e¤ect of reducing competition. However, if
the e¤ect is dominant, the M&A cannot pass anti-trust regulation.
29See also pp294, Johnson and Petrone (1998).
30This is component 3 in pp295, supra.
31pp296, supra.
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mechanism, but with their ability to "entertain" old teachers in research.
Overall, the market for reputation exists extensively, even though sometimes implicitly, and
the mechanism, as discussed in the paper here, captures the essence of the way in which our
human societies make organizations derive and bear reputation, for the purpose of avoiding the
cost of rebuilding reputation generation by generation.
In the economy of the paper, as shown in the benchmark, if reputation dies with the people
building it, the economy has ine¢ ciently zero social surplus. On the contrary, if organizations,
which are no more than names shared by the members of di¤erent periods, derive and bear rep-
utation, then the reputed names function as signalling and sorting instruments to exclude the
unqualied from production. In addition if we go further in personalizing organizations by im-
posing ethical evaluations about the pricing behaviour upon them, the social welfare is increased
in addition, as then the names of high enough reputation work as the device of committing to
pricing the products honestly, which unqualied producers never want to do.
More interestingly, I spell out fully the up and down of the reputation with respect to the
organizationsperformance in the second best. In the basic part where no ex post signals or
ethic are introduced, the simple Single Name Equilibrium implements the second best in which
the dynamics of the reputation is a Markovian transformation between two states and has no
memory. When the ex post signals and ethic are introduced, the dynamics has long memory and
the four features: (1) the reputation increases after a success; (2) it decreases after a failure and
is destroyed totally by it if the reputation is already low enough; (3) it has a ceiling level and
only names having the ceiling reputation communicate the quality of their products honestly
through prices; (4) the ceiling reputation is not swayed by the performance, but is destroyed by
dishonest pricing behaviour. And comparatively the lower surplus average good sellers generate,
the longer period is needed for the reputation to evolve from none to the ceiling level. All these
features of the dynamics and the comparative statics are empirically testable if we have full
edged data of goodwill.
7 Appendix
Some lengthy proofs are put here. Here I also use p(h) for the price of h-names.
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given any h-names, dene W t(h) the total values of the names that the h-names generates after
t periods. FormallyW t(h) =
P
h02Ht
(h0)p(hh0): SurelyW 0(h) = ph andW 1(h) = qhp(hs)+ (1 
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qh)p(hf): No Ponzi requires that rtW t(h)  ! 0 for any h names.
Claim 1: W 1(h)  ph 
r
for any h-names.
Proof : Consider all the sellers of holding the h-names. Up to the multiplier of the names
mass, the sum of their return is  ph + h + rW 1(h), where h is the sum of their prot from
selling the widgets. In equilibrium any sellers return is non-negative while his prot is no bigger
than : Thus  ph +h + rW 1(h)  0 and h  , which implies claim 1. Q.E.D.
Claim 2: W t+1(h)  W t(h) 
r
for any t and any h-name.
Proof : By mathematical induction. For t = 0; the claim is exactly claim 1. Suppose the
claim is true for t = k 1: Then consider the case t = k: RememberW k+1(h) = qhW k(hs)+(1 
qh)W
k(hf): Then by induction hypothesis, W k+1(h)  qhW t 1(hs) r + (1  qh)W
t 1(hf) 
r
=
qhW
k 1(hs)+(1 qh)Wk 1(hf) 
r
= W
k(h) 
r
: Therefore I have proven it for t = k: Q.E.D.
The following claim is used as a technical tool.
Claim 3 (Comparison Lemma): Suppose sequence fxtg is dened as follows. x0 = ph =
W 0(h) and xt+1 = xt r for t  0. Then W t(h)  xt for any t  0:
Proof : By mathematical induction. t = 0; that is true by assumption. Suppose the claim is
true for t = k   1: Then consider the case t = k: By claim 2, W t+1(h)  W t(h) 
r
 xt 
r
= xt+1;
where the second inequality applies the induction hypothesis. Q.E.D.
Then I can prove a rst main result here, which is about the upper bound of namesprice.
Claim 4: for any h-name, ph  1 r :
Proof : Suppose on the contrary for some h-name, ph = W 0(h) > 1 r : Then compute the
sequence dened in claim 3. It is easy to get that xt = (1r )
t ph(1 r) 
1 r + b for some b. Then
rtW t(h)  rtxt  ! ph(1 r) 1 r > 0. Thus No Ponzi condition is violated. Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First P  vh
r
> qv: Thus P    > qv    = c: For any " such that 0 < " < minfc; RG
rq
  g; nd
h names such that p(h) > P  ": Then rstly p(h) >  as P  " > P   c > : And the names
cannot be only bought by bad sellers, since otherwise p(hf) = p(h
)+c
r
> P
r
> P; contradictory to
the denition of P . Thirdly, p(hf)  vh
r
. Otherwise by (5), p(hs) = p(hf)+ RG
rq
+ 1
rq
h; which
is a decreasing function of p(hf) if p(hf)  ph 
r
and a increasing function if otherwise. Therefore
p(hs)  p(hf) + RG
rq
+ 1
rq
hjp(hf)= p(h) 
r
= p(h
) 
r
+ RG
rq
> p(h)   + RG
rq
> p(h) + " > P , a
contradiction again. Thus p(hf)  vh
r
and the names are commitment names.
Then the dynamics are described by (6). Hence RG =  p(h) +  + rqp(hs) + r(1  
q)p(hf)   P + " +  + [rq + r(1   q) ]P ) P   RG+"
1 rq r(1 q) : Let "  ! 0; we get that
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P   RG
1 rq r(1 q) : Q.E.D.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Two cases are needed to consider, depending on which names are the rst ceiling names. In
evolvable equilibria if hf -names are not ceiling names, phf < phs by (5). Thus in an equilibrium
with height N + 1; p(sN) > p(h) for all h 2 HN : Therefore only sNf or sN+1 names could be
the rst ceiling names.
Suppose that sN+1 names are the rst ceiling names. To make the value increase as possible
as it can at each stage, I set p(snf) = 0: Then applying (5) for h = sn, qp(sn+1)+ p(sn) = qps
for 1  n  N: Then from the equation, p(sN+1) = ps 
1 q (
1
q
)N +  qps
1 q : And qps =  p(sN+1)+;
from which ps =
 p(sN+1)+
q
: Substitute that into the equation of p(sN+1) and remember 
1 q =
1    ; then we get P = p(sN+1) = 
qN+1+(1 qN+1)(1 ) : If s
N+1 names are ceiling names as
supposed, then p(sN+1)  vh ,   [qN+1 + (1  qN+1)(1  )]vh: Therefore if (1  )vh <  <
[qN+1 + (1  qN+1)(1  )]vh; sN+1 names cannot be the rst ceiling names.
Suppose that sN+1f names are the rst ceiling names. By (3) for h = sN , p(sN+1f) 
p(sN)+c: Thus if the supposition is true, p(sN)  vh c: By the calculation above the maximum
p(sN) = ps 
1 q (
1
q
)N 1 +  qps
1 q : And qps = RG   vh +  ) ps   v
h+
q
: Then p(sN) 
q N   (q N   1)(1  )vh: Therefore sN+1f names are the rst ceiling names only if q N  
(q N   1)(1   )vh  vh   c. Remember c = qv    = (q + )vh   : Substitute into the
last inequality, then q N   (q N   1)(1   )vh  vh   (q + )vh + ; which is equivalent
to (q N   1)  [(q N   1)(1   ) + (1   q   ]vh ,   [1    + (1 q)
q N 1 ]v
h: Therefore if
(1  )vh <  < [1   + (1 q)
q N 1 ]v
h, the rst ceiling names cannot be sNf names. Q.E.D.
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